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FAMILY LAW-INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS-MENTAL INCAPACITY-The Supreme Court of Pennsylva-
nia held that a court must examine the strength of the existing
emotional bond between the natural parent and the child before
involuntarily terminating parental rights.
In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1993).
Elizabeth M. ("Appellant") was the natural mother of Louis C.
and Erick C.1 Appellant suffered from mental retardation2 and her
children were similarly afflicted.' In 1982, Children and Youth Ser-
vices of Allegheny County ("CYS") became aware of Appellant's
difficulties in providing for her children.' CYS observed major defi-
ciencies in Appellant's capacity as a parent.5 For example, Appel-
lant failed to feed her children properly and failed to maintain
clean and sanitary living conditions."
Shortly before 1982, Appellant began receiving assistance from
various remedial programs designed to enhance her skills so that
she could better provide for her children.7 Appellant diligently par-
ticipated in the programs but failed to make any progress and it
was determined that she was not able to care for her children.8
Consequently, CYS determined that, in order for Appellant to re-
sume caring for her children, Appellant would require twenty-four
1. In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 482 (Pa. 1993). Louis C. and Erick C. were seven and
nine, respectively, at the time of the hearing. In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 482.
2. Appellant received a high school diploma from the Mon Valley School for Excep-
tional Children. In re E.M., 584 A.2d 1014, 1024 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), rev'd, 620 A.2d 481
(Pa. 1993).
3. In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 482. Erick suffered from both physical and mental retar-
dation and had an impairment in his ability to walk and speak. Id. Louis was learning dis-
abled and had an attention deficiency. Id.
4. Id. The Appellant was a victim of domestic violence by the children's natural
father ("Mr. C.") and was having difficulty with rent payments and food purchases. Id. Mr.
C. had expensive drug and alcohol habits. Id. By March of 1983, the situation had worsened;
the family was evicted from its residence and forced to seek shelter at a Salvation Army
facility. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. See also, In re E.M., 584 A.2d at 1015. Appellant fed her children from dirty
bottles of spoiled and diluted milk, left dirty diapers in the family's living space for days at
a time, and provided insufficient medical care. In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 482-83.
7. Id. at 483. Appellant participated in these programs for approximately six years.
Id.
8. In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 483. The children had special needs as a result of their
own disabilities. Id. See note 3.
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hour supervision by an assistant skilled in the care of special needs
children.' In 1983, the children were declared dependent and
placed with a foster family.10 The children had remained in the
care of the same foster family since 1983, and their foster parents
wished to adopt them.1 Appellant continued to have an interest in
the children and visited them regularly.12 In 1987, Appellant
moved into a clean apartment with her paramour who expressed a
willingness to assist in caring for Appellant's children; nonetheless,
he recognized that he and Appellant would need assistance if they
were to attempt to provide care.13 However, CYS had already de-
termined that reunification of the family was impossible and that
the best interests of the children would be served by a plan of
adoption."
In 1989, CYS filed a petition to terminate Appellant's parental
rights on the grounds that she was unable to properly provide for
her children. 5 Thereafter, Appellant's rights were terminated in-
voluntarily by the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
pursuant to the Adoption Act'" ("Act") due to her inability to ade-
quately care for the children. 17 Consequently, an appeal to the su-




12. Id. Appellant continued to hope that someday her children would be returned to
her. Id.
13. In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 483.
14. Id. CYS made this determination sometime in 1985 or 1986 after the programs
designed to improve the Appellant's parenting skills had proven futile. Id.
15. Id. This was done in order to facilitate the children's adoption by the foster par-
ents. Id.
16. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511 (1991 & Supp. 1993). The Act provides in pertinent
part:
Grounds for voluntary termination
(a) General rule. - The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated
after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the
parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions
and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
(b) Other considerations. - The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall
give primary consideration to the needs and welfare of the child ..
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511(a)(2); (b) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
17. In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 482. The court of common pleas originally denied the
petition but exceptions were filed, and, upon reconsideration, the court reversed its decision
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perior court was taken by Appellant.'" The superior court affirmed
the lower court's decision and employed a three-part test for invol-
untary termination pursuant to the Act to review the propriety of
parental termination."9 The court stated that there was competent
testimony of Appellant's lack of progress and inability to increase
her parenting skills; hence, the court determined that Appellant
was an incompetent parent.20 Accordingly, the court maintained
that the record clearly and convincingly2' supported the finding
that the needs and welfare of the children would be served best
through termination of Appellant's parental rights.22 Moreover, the
superior court found that there was no need to determine whether
a bond existed between the Appellant and her children because
adoption was imminent.23
Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania by
writ of allocatur.24 The supreme court focused on the issue of
whether the decree terminating Appellant's parental rights was ad-
equately supported by the evidence and was based on proper con-
sideration of the needs and welfare of the children.2 The court
agreed with the superior court that Appellant had been unable to
and thereby granted the petition. Id. at 483. Further, the parental rights of the father were
terminated with his consent. Id.
18. Id.
19. In re E.M., 584 A.2d at 1018. The three-part test was as follows: "(1) repeated
and continued incapacity...; (2) that such incapacity . . . caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity.
cannot or will not be remedied." Id. (citing In re Geiger, 331 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1975)).
20. In re E.M., 584 A.2d at 1019. The court opined that CYS provided Appellant
with a plan for the return of her children and that CYS changed its goal to adoption only
after exhausting available services. Id.
21. • The court defined clear and convincing evidence as "testimony [which] is so clear,
direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the [fact finder] to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." Id. at 1018 (citing In re Trust
Est. of LaRocca, 192 A.2d 409, 413 (Pa. 1963)).
22. In re E.M., 584 A.2d at 1022.
23. Id. The court further stated that this holding disregarded any beneficial relation-
ship that existed between Appellant and her children, but that it was for the legislature to
consider the propriety of this result. Id. at 1023.
Judge Johnson dissented on the grounds that the trial court's decision to terminate was
not supported by competent evidence. Id. at 1024. Judge Johnson stated that the record was
devoid of evidence addressing the effect upon the children of cutting off the undisputed
beneficial relationship with the natural mother. Id. (Johnson, J. dissenting).
24. In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 481. Allocatur is a latin term which the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania uses to describe allowance of appeals; it means "it is allowed". BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 75 (6th ed. 1990).
25. In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 483. The court contended that its review was limited to
the determination of whether the decree of termination was supported by competent evi-
dence. Id. at 484.
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provide adequate care for her children.2' Further, the court con-
cluded that Appellant's incapacity would not be remedied because
she had failed to progress in remedial programs.27 However, the
court determined that this incapacity did not in itself require that
Appellant's parental rights be terminated unless termination
served the needs and welfare of the children. 8
Moreover, the supreme court determined that the Act provided
a basis to terminate parental rights when a parent was physically
or mentally impaired.2 9 Nonetheless, the court held that the termi-
nation of parental rights could not be sustained when there had
not been adequate consideration of the emotional needs of the
children.30 Accordingly, the court discerned that the emotional
bond between the Appellant and her children had been inade-
quately considered in the proceedings below.3" The court opined
that although the existence of some bond between Appellant and
the children would not of itself block a termination of rights, it was
at least a factor that should have been more fully explored.2 The
court asserted that because the psychological evaluations recom-
mended by CYS's own expert witness had not been performed, 3
CYS had not met its burden of proving the necessity for terminat-
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 484.
29. Id. at 483 (citing In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 883, 892 (Pa. 1986)).
30. In re E. M., 620 A.2d at 483. Appellant alleged that a strong emotional bond
existed between her and the children. Id. at 484. The court, relying on the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania's decision in In re P.A.B., 570 A.2d 522 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), appeal granted,
585 A.2d 469 (Pa. 1991), appeal dismissed, 607 A.2d 1074 (Pa. 1992), held that "[a] court, in
considering what situation would best serve the child's needs and welfare, must examine the
status of the natural parental bond to consider whether terminating the natural parents'
rights would destroy something in existence that is necessary and beneficial." In re E.M.,
620 A.2d at 483 (citing In re P.A.B., 570 A.2d at 525.)
In re P.A.B. involved an appeal from an order involuntarily terminating mentally incapac-
itated parents' parental rights where a parent-child bond existed. In re P.A.B., 570 A.2d at
522. The court in that case found that a court must consider the parent-child bond before
terminating a natural parent's rights. Id. at 525. See notes 91 - 104 and accompanying text.
31. In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 483. The court reasoned that the emotional bond was an
important element relating to the needs and welfare of the children. Id.
32. In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 485.
33. Id. at 485. The CYS expert in this case, a psychologist, testified that the children
interacted well with their foster mother and that they had formed a strong bond with her.
Id. at 484. No observation was made of the children's interaction with their foster father or
with the Appellant. Id. The expert further stated that interaction with both should have
been observed to make the determination of whether to terminate the Appellant's parental
rights. Id. The psychologist also testified that the children continued to have an emotional
bond with Appellant and expressed a desire to live with both their foster parents and their
natural parents. Id. at 483.
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ing Appellant's parental rights.3 4
Further, the supreme court disagreed with the superior court's
determination that where adoption was imminent there was no
need to evaluate the emotional bond between the children and
their natural parent.3 5 Instead, the court stated that a decision to
terminate parental rights without consideration of existing emo-
tional bonds was not proper. 6
The court concluded that the issue of whether a bond existed
between Appellant and her children, so that the severance of their
relationship would be improper, must be more fully explored by
the evidence. Therefore, the supreme court reversed and re-
manded the case to the court of common pleas for a reevaluation
of the needs and welfare of the children. 8 The court mandated
that the lower court take into consideration the bond which may
have existed between Appellant and her children, along with any
other factors concerning the needs and welfare of the children. 9
Prior to the passage of the Adoption Act of 1970,"o abandonment
was the only basis the courts could use to involuntarily terminate
parental rights.4 ' With the passage of the Adoption Act of 1970,
34. Id. at 484-85. It had been established that in a proceeding to involuntarily termi-
nate parental rights, the burden of proof is upon the party seeking termination to establish
by clear and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for doing so. Id. at 484 (citations
omitted).
35. Id. at 485. The supreme court maintained that it was conceivable that a beneficial
bond could have existed between a parent and child such that, if the bond was broken, the
child could have suffered extreme emotional consequences. Id. This would be true regardless
of whether adoption was imminent. Id.
36. Id. The court specifically explained that termination was not proper because a
bond to some extent did exist between the children and the natural mother and the expert
witness for CYS indicated that this factor had not been adequately studied. Id.
37. In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 485. The court remarked that the existing record was
inadequate regarding this issue. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 101 - 603 (Supp. 1974) (repealed 1980).
Section 311 of the Adoption Act regarding involuntary termination was derived from sec-
tion 1.2 of the 1925 Adoption Act of April, 1925, Pub. L. No. 127 § 1.2, which required a
finding of abandonment for at least six months. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 § 311 (Supp. 1974)
(repealed 1980). The grounds for abandonment were broadened by the Act, wherefore relin-
quishment of parental claim or failure or refusal to perform parental duties was sufficient.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2511 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
41. Jones Appeal, 297 A.2d 117, 119 (Pa. 1972). Abandonment was defined as "paren-
tal conduct exhibiting a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to the child and a
refusal to perform parental duties." Jones Appeal, 297 A.2d at 119 (citing Act of April 4,
1925, Pa. Laws. No. 127, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1.) This act was repealed by
Act of July 24, 1970, Pa. Laws. No. 208 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 601). Jones
Appeal, 297 A.2d at 119.
1994
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the Pennsylvania Legislature developed a new standard for the in-
voluntary termination of parental rights.42 Indeed, the legislature
intended to facilitate adoption and to liberalize the requirements
for a showing of involuntary termination thereby creating a new
basis for termination."s Accordingly, the only requirements neces-
sary to terminate parental rights under the Adoption Act of 1970
were the filing of a petition, the holding of a pre-termination hear-
ing and the finding of non-remedied grounds of repeated and con-
tinued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent which
caused the child to be without essential care."
However, in Jones Appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
strictly construed the requirement of repeated and continued inca-
pacity, abuse, neglect or refusal on the part of the parent.45 In
Jones Appeal, the parental rights of the natural mother, Mrs.
Jones, were terminated after she was convicted of aiding and abet-
ting the rape of her fourteen-year old daughter.46 Although the
court determined that the 1970 Adoption Act was an expansion of
its powers to terminate parental rights, the court reversed the
lower court's termination of Mrs. Jones' parental rights, finding
that the statutory standard of evidence necessary to support termi-
nation was nonetheless demanding.47 The court concluded that the
legislature intended that courts should not disturb the parent-
child relationship unless compelling evidence of repeated and con-
tinued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal to provide essential pa-
rental care existed.
48
Section 5 of the Act of 1925 repealed prior adoption acts as early as the Act of 1855. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §1 (1963) (repealed 1970).
42. See Catherine B. Strauss, Comment, Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights Under the Pennsylvania Adoption Act, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 1050 (1975).
43. Strauss, cited at note 42, at 1050. Under the previous act, parental abandonment
of the child was the only rationale the courts could utilize to terminate parental rights invol-
untarily. Id. at 1050 .n.14. Abandonment was extremely difficult prove. Id.
44. Id. at 1050 n.3.
45. Jones Appeal, 297 A.2d at 117. See also Strauss, cited at note 42, at 1056.
46. Jones Appeal, 297 A.2d at 119. After her arrest, the natural mother was commit-
ted to Mayview State Hospital for psychiatric evaluation and was found to be neurotic'and
unstable. Id. at 118.
47. Id. at 119.
48. Id. The court further held that the mother's guilty plea to the accessory to rape
charge did not in itself meet the statutory standard of continued abuse necessary to support
termination. Id. The court remanded the case for further proceedings because of the impor-
tance of the adjudication of the children's well being. Id. at 121.
The Adoption Act of 1970 was repealed by the Adoption Act of 1980 which expanded the
grounds by which involuntary termination of parental rights could occur, such as where the
natural parent was unknown and could not be found and when the child is in foster care
Vol. 32:393
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Courts were cautious to exercise the power of involuntary termi-
nation of parental rights, particularly when dealing with natural
parents with mental disabilities who wanted to retain custody of
their children. Accordingly, in In re C.R.,49 the orphan's court exer-
cised caution when determining whether involuntary termination
was proper." In re C.R. involved a mother who was diagnosed with
schizophrenia with a slight chance of recovery. 1 The relationship
of the natural mother to her daughter was greatly affected by the
mother's mental incapacity because she could not provide essential
parental care.2
.In its opinion, the court asserted that its power to terminate pa-
rental rights should be used sparingly, with great caution and only
when the evidence was quite clear and convincing.53 Nonetheless,
the court determined that in this case the natural mother's condi-
tion could not be remedied;5 thus, her rights were terminated due
to her continued incapacity.5 5 The court emphasized that the inter-
ests of the child outweighed the interests of the parent. 6
Later in Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights to
R.W.B., 5 the court determined that the legislature's intent in its
passage of the Act was to terminate parental rights despite a par-
ent's desire to perform parental obligations and regardless of
fault.58 In R.W.B., the child never resided with her mother who
was a paranoid schizophrenic. 9 The mother had a history of
mental illness and prognosis for recovery was poor." However, the
and the conditions leading to the placement of the child in foster care cannot be remedied.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §2511 (1991 & Supp. 1993), as amended.
49. 66 Pa. D. & C.2d 155, 161 (Butler, 1974).
50. In Re C.R., 66 Pa. D. & C.2d at 161.
51. Id. at 157.
52. Id. at 158. The court determined that because of the mother's illness she was
unable to provide the emotional support that her daughter would require. Id. at 161.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 158.
55. In re C.R., 66 Pa. D. & C.2d at 159. The court based its decision on the terms of
the Act calling for termination in the case of continued incapacity. Id. See also 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §2511(a)(2) (1993). The court stated that it would not rely on psychiatrist testi-
mony of incapacity alone but that there was ample evidence to conclude that the natural
mother's incapacity was of long duration and continuous. Id.
56. Id. The natural mother had maintained an interest in and concern for the child
while the child had been in foster care. Id. at 157.
57. 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 369 (Phila. 1975).
58. R. W.B, 73 Pa. D. & C.2d. at 376. The court posed the question as whether the
incapacity must be determined to have been the fault of the parent before the parent's
rights could terminated. Id.
59. Id. at 370-71.
60. Id. at 373.
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mother maintained constant interest and concern for her daugh-
ter."1 Notwithstanding this fact, the court concluded that there was
competent evidence of continued incapacity which could not be
remedied, and therefore, the court terminated the mother's paren-
tal rights although it found that the incapacity was not her fault. 62
Subsequently, in In re William,6e the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania considered whether the Act violated the due process
rights of parents whose rights were involuntarily terminated.6 4 In
In re William, three of appellant's five children were removed
from her home because of 'appellant's incapacity and failure to pro-
vide for their essential needs.6 5
The parents argued that they had a constitutional right to asso-
ciate with their children. However, the court asserted that prior
to the termination of parental rights, a court had to find the exis-
tence of continued incapacity coupled with an inability to meet the
child's essential needs. 7 Moreover, when an agency has petitioned
61. Id. at 373. Nonetheless, the mother never provided support for the child. Id. at
374.
62. Id. at 375.
63. 383 A.2d 1228 (Pa. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
64. In re William, 383 A.2d at 1229.
65. Id. at 1237. Children's Services determined that the condition of appellant's
home was severely substandard and that the home was unfit for the occupancy of children.
Id. Appellant was given aid by Children's Services but it was determined that she could only
care for one child because she could not perform simple everyday tasks without aid. Id. at
1238. Further, she failed to make progress in dealing with problems on her own despite
continuous assistance. Id. Therefore, Children's Services refused to return the children to
appellant upon her request. Id. When asked, appellant's children stated that they did not
want to live with her. Id. at 1238-39.
66. Id. at 1231. The parents relied on the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution. Id.
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
The Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "The enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
67. In re William, 383 A.2d at 1232. The court further stated that because it was
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a court for involuntary termination of parental rights, the Com-
monwealth required that services were provided to the parent to
help remedy the causes of removal."' The supreme court held that
these requirements gave the parent sufficient notice to satisfy due
process.6 9
The court concluded that the Act posed very demanding stan-
dards that must be met before Children's Services interferes with a
family and that the Act protected parental conduct which did not
deprive a child of its essential needs. 70 Therefore, the state su-
preme court determined that the Act did not violate substantive
due process and that a state had a compelling interest in the wel-
fare of the children and could constitutionally intervene to termi-
nate parental rights when a natural parent's incapacity did not al-
low the parent to provide for the essential needs of the child.7 '
The United States Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer7 2 es-
tablished that clear and convincing evidence, its equivalent, or a
higher standard, was the standard of proof to be used by a state
required that the parents' conduct caused the termination, any notice argument was thereby
negated. Id: Consequently, the court declared that in this case parental rights were not ter-
minated without sufficient notice. Id.
68. Id. It was clear that the parents were provided with years of assistance from Chil-
dren's Services and public agencies. Id.
69. Id. The court said that the requirement that parental conduct be irremediable
also negated the parent's notice argument. Id.
70. Id. at 1234. The court stated that extended entrustment of the child to another's
care based on parental incapacity was relevant in determining whether the child had been
without essential parental care. Id. at 1232. In this case, all of appellant's children had been
in foster care for an extended period of time. Id. Appellant's youngest son had been in foster
care since he was one year old. Id. at 1238-39.
71. Id. at 1234. The scope of appellate review was limited to determining whether the
lower court's termination of parental rights was supported by competent evidence. Id. (cita-
tions omitted.) The court declared that in this case there was competent evidence which
supported the termination of appellant's parental rights. Id. at 1236. The supreme court
agreed with the decision in R.W.B. and determined that fault or misconduct of the parent
was not necessary for the termination of parental rights. Id. at 1239. Further, the court
stated that the legislative intent was that a parent who was incapable of performing paren-
tal duties was just as unfit as a parent who refuses to perform parental duties. Id. Hence,
the supreme court concluded that the termination of parental rights was based on compe-
tent evidence and affirmed the lower court's decision. Id. at 1238, 1247.
Justice Nix dissented and argued that a child could not be declared neglected just because
his condition might be improved by changing parents; further, termination of appellant's
parental rights violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution because it demonstrated the classification between the wealthy and the poor.
Id. at 1248, 1250.
Justice Manderino also dissented and maintained that if a parent was incapacitated, the
state should provide care for the children outside of the parent's custody but should not
terminate the parent's rights because this was too final. Id. at 1252.
72. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
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when terminating parental rights.73 In Santosky, the petitioners'
parental rights were terminated after various proceedings in which
it was determined by a preponderance of the evidence that they
were incapable of meeting their children's needs. 74
The respondent claimed that the termination proceedings did
not interfere with the parents' fundamental rights..7 The Supreme
Court rejected this argument and held that when a state moves to
destroy family bonds, it must provide the parent with fair proce-
dures. 76 The Court maintained that the standard of preponderance
of the evidence was appropriate only when society had minimal
concern with the outcome of the proceeding; therefore, this was not
a sufficiently stringent standard when dealing with fundamental
rights.77 Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court stated that
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard was too strict.78 Hence,
the Court determined that an intermediate standard of clear and
convincing evidence, or its equivalent, should be used by a state
when terminating parental rights.79 The Court further held that a
state may use a higher standard of proof than clear and convincing
evidence if it so desired. 0 The Supreme Court concluded that the
clear and convincing evidence standard struck a fair balance be-
tween the rights of the natural parents and the interest of a state.81
Thereafter, in In re Adoption of J.J., 2 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania addressed the issue of whether clear and convincing
evidence was the proper standard of proof when involuntarily ter-
minating the rights of a parent who suffered from a mental impair-
ment.83 Here, the parental rights of the appellee were terminated
73. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769. The Court mentioned that Pennsylvania used clear
and convincing evidence as its standard of proof. Id. at 750.
74. Id. at 751. This proceeding was held after the children were removed from the
home following incidents of neglect. Id. The petitioners had five children, two were born
after the first three were removed from the home. Id. The state never took action to remove
the two children who remained in the care of the petitioners. Id. at 752.
75. Id. at 752 n.7.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 755.
78. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755.
79. Id. The Supreme Court said that this intermediate standard should be used when
individual interests were at stake which were particularly important and more substantial
than the mere loss of money. Id.
80. Id. at 769-70.
81. Id. at 769. Therefore, the Court vacated the lower court's judgment and re-
manded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 770.
82. 515 A.2d 883 (Pa. 1986).
83. In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d at 885.
Vol. 32:393
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due to his schizophrenic condition. 4
The court reaffirmed that in a proceeding to involuntarily termi-
nate parental rights, the burden of proof was on the party seeking
termination to prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds
for termination. 5 However, the supreme court considered whether
a higher standard of proof should be used when the parent's rights
were terminated on the grounds of mental incapacity. s6 The court
answered this question in the negative.8 7 Instead, the state su-
preme court determined that it was the child's needs and welfare
with which the court must be concerned and that the child's inter-
ests should prevail over that of the parents.8 8 Therefore, a higher
standard of proof would not improve the function of the court; in-
stead, it would only inhibit efforts to offer neglected children the
possibility of adoption. 9 The court concluded that the Act pro-
vided for termination regardless of fault or misconduct; hence, no
higher standard for mentally impaired parents was necessary.90
Recently, in In re P.A.B.,91 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
determined that the parent-child bond must be considered when
deciding whether to terminate parental rights.92 In re P.A.B. dealt
with mentally incapacitated natural parents of three children with
special needs. 3 The children were removed from the family home
despite the parents' continued effort to care for them.' CYS ar-
84. Id. at 886-87. The appellee had been diagnosed as schizophrenic with mood dis-
turbance. Id. at 887. Appellee's condition could be helped by medication but the condition
would become active if he stopped using the medication. Id. The appellee's rights were ter-
minated because his illness caused him to be incapable of performing parental duties. Id.
85. Id. at 886 (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 891.
87. Id. at 892.
88. In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d at 891-92.
89. Id. at 892-93. The court found no merit in the argument that a more rigorous
standard would protect mentally incapacitated parents; instead, the court was only con-
cerned with protection of the children. Id. at 892.
90. Id. The court stressed that the best interests of the child must be considered. Id.
The supreme court held that parents have an affirmative duty to work towards having the
child returned to them and that the appellee had not met this duty. Id. at 890. The court
noted that the parent at least must cooperate with the agency to obtain services to help
meet the goal of the return of the child. Id. The court held that appellee often acted with
hostility directed towards the agency when it was trying to help him. Id.
91. 570 A.2d 522 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), appeal granted, 585 A.2d 469 (Pa. 1991),
appeal dismissed, 607 A.2d 1074 (Pa. 1992).
92. In re P.A.B, 570 A.2d at 522.
93. Id. at 523. P.A.B. was moderately retarded, M.E.B. suffered from developmental
problems and M.A.B. took medication for a heart disease. Id.
94. Id. The parents received aid from various agencies after the removal of the chil-
dren. Id. They continued to strive towards the children's return despite the extreme hard-
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gued that a permanent mental disability alone was sufficient to
satisfy involuntary termination of parental rights.9 5 However, the
court disagreed and held that the Act required a decision based
upon the needs and welfare of the children."6 The superior court
defined needs and welfare as encompassing both tangible and in-
tangible needs such as food and parental love. 7 The court opined
that the parent-child bond was unique and irreplaceable; hence,
preservation of the family unity was best for the child.98 Moreover,
the court maintained that when the natural parents were a solid
presence in the child's life, termination would not be in the best
interests of the child.99
The superior court held that for purposes of the Act, the paren-
tal bond, must be considered before terminating parental rights
due to the importance of that bond, regardless of the parent's
mental capacity.100 Thus, the court concluded that the parental
bond must be examined to determine whether termination would
sever that which was necessary and beneficial to the child.' 0 ' Ac-
cordingly, the superior court reversed the order terminating the
parents' rights and determined that it was possible for the children
to live outside the parental home and yet preserve the parent-child
relationship. 102
Pennsylvania courts have dealt in a consistent manner with the
termination of parental rights in cases involving parents adjudged
incapacitated due to a mental impairment. Hence, in Jones Ap-
peal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania set forth the law with
regard to incapacitated parents' rights; that is, absent clear and
convincing evidence of continuous, recurring parental incapacity,
the courts should not disturb the parent-child relationship. 03 The
superior court in In re P.A.B. set forth the principle that the par-
ent-child bond must be considered by the court when deciding to
ship which resulted. Id.
95. Id. at 525.
96. Id.
97. In re P.A.B., 570 A.2d at 525.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 525-26.
101. Id. at 525. The court resolved that the party seeking termination must prove that
the parent-child bond did not exist or that the bond hindered the child. Id. The court fur-
ther determined that removing a child from the parental home did not necessarily lead to
the breaking of the parental bond. Id.
102. In re P.A.B., 570 A.2d at 522, 528. The court concluded that the children's family
could be extended, thereby enriching the lives of the children. Id. at 528.
103. Jones Appeal, 297 A.2d at 119. See notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
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terminate parental rights. 10 4 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
in In re E.M. did not deviate from this principle. In fact, the court
did not even ponder the issue of the due process rights of the par-
ents because the issue had been clearly decided by prior case
law.105 Further, the court quickly disposed of the issues regarding
scope of review, burden and standard of proof because Santosky v.
Kramer"'0 had settled these issues.
10 7
In short, the supreme court set forth three standards for termi-
nation of parental rights: repeated and continued incapacity; such
incapacity caused the children to be without essential parental
care; and the causes of the incapacity could not be remedied.' 0 8
Consequently, the court determined that these standards were suf-
ficient to terminate parental rights on the basis of mental incapac-
ity regardless of fault or misconduct.'0 The supreme court in In re
E.M. agreed with the superior court that Appellant's incapacity
was irremediable and rendered her incapable of caring for her chil-
dren.'10 However, the supreme court disagreed with the superior
court's decision that the termination of Appellant's rights was con-
sistent with the needs and welfare of the children."' More specifi-
cally, the court agreed with Appellant's contention that the emo-
tional bond between Appellant and the children was not
adequately considered."'
Notwithstanding the court's decision, a viable option which the
court failed to consider was the possibility of an open adoption, by
which Appellant's parental rights would have been terminated and
a decree of adoption could have been entered which would have
included a clause that Appellant would be allowed visitation with
her children."13 Open adoption would allow the foster parents of
the children to adopt them and have full authority to make all de-
cisions concerning the children while allowing the Appellant to
104. In re P.A.B., 570 A.2d at 522. See notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
105. See In re William, 383 A.2d at 1231. See notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
106. 455 U.S. at 745. See notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
107. In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 484.
108. Id. at 483. See also 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2511 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
109. In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 483-84.
110. Id. at 484.
111. Id. at 485.
112. Id. It was on this basis that the court reversed and remanded the case. Id.
113. Appellant's Brief at 11, In re E.M., 584 A.2d 1014 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (No. 88).
The child advocate agreed that open adoption would be a just solution to this matter. Child
Advocate Brief at 12, In re E.M., 584 A.2d 1014 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (No. 88). The superior
court in In re E.M. left the issue of open adoption to the legislature. In re E.M., 584 A.2d at
1023. The supreme court failed to address the issue.
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continue her relationship with the children.114 An open adoption
could benefit the children and avoid the psychological harm which
could result from the severance of ties between the children and
their mother.'1
Nevertheless, some courts have found open adoption harmful be-
cause it interferes with the development of a new relationship be-
tween the child and the adoptive parents."' However, in the pre-
sent case the children already had a relationship with their foster
parents and the continuation of the relationship with their natural
mother would not have hindered this relationship; instead, it
would have expanded the family of the children and enhanced
their lives. Open adoption would lessen the uncertainty in the
children's lives and provide them with security." 8 Indeed, a child's
fear of being removed from home at any time coupled with feelings
of insecurity have been among the main reasons courts have termi-
nated natural parent's rights.119
A New York court noted that where a child had lived with the
natural mother, had a continued relationship with the natural
mother and was currently a teenager or a preteen, severing the
bond between the child and mother would be detrimental to the
needs and welfare of the child, especially where the child had a
desire to continue the relationship with the parent. 20 Therefore,
the court concluded that open adoption was the proper solution.'
12
In the instant case, Appellant's children had previously resided
114. Child Advocate Brief at 12, In re E. M., 584 A. 2d 1014 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (No.
88).
115. Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Post Adoption Visitation by Natural Parent, 78
A.L.R. 4th 218, 223 (1990).
116. Veilleux, cited at note 115, at 223.
117. In re P.A.B., 570 A.2d at 528.
118. See In re P.A.B., 570 A.2d at 528, wherein the court said that there was no prece-
dent that prevented children from maintaining a relationship with a natural parent while
living outside the parental home. Also, courts in Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Ne-
vada, New Jersey, New York and Utah have held that post adoption visitation rights may be
granted to a natural parent if it were in the best interests of the child. See Veilleux, cited at
note 115, at 240.
119. See In re P.A.B., 570 A.2d at 526.
120. In the Matter of the Custody and Guardianship of Dana Marie E., 492 N.Y.S.2d
340, 343 (1985). This case involved a termination of parental rights proceeding brought
against both natural parents by a home for children. Dana Marie E., 492 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
The court records state that the natural mother suffered from paranoid schizophrenia,
which rendered her unable to provide proper care for the child. Id. at 342.
121. Id. at 343-44. Although the Dana Marie E court acknowledged that post-adop-
tion visitation was inappropriate in most circumstances, it declared that there were select
cases, especially those in which the children were teenagers or preteens, that open adoption
was appropriate. Id. at 343.
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with their mother and had had a continued relationship with her
since birth.122 The fact that the children had expressed their desire
to continue the relationship with their natural mother should not
have been ignored. 123 In fact, Judge Johnson, dissenting from the
superior court's opinion in In re E.M., agreed that severing the
rights of Appellant was not in the best interest of the children.
2 4
CYS gave only the option of adoption or returning the children to
Appellant. 25 However, Judge Johnson maintained that these alter-
natives were not exclusive and believed that the children should be
permitted to visit with their mother. 21 Open adoption would have
provided this result.
The superior court believed that it did not have the power to
order an open adoption and decided that it was appropriate to
leave the question to the legislature. 27 Perhaps the court reasoned
that the legislature would better balance critical choices of social
policy along with the fragile issues of the family relationship in-
volved to make such a determination. 28 However, in this case,
open adoption would have provided a satisfactory outcome with
regard to all parties and would have best served the needs and wel-
fare of the children. Hence, the court would have been justified in
allowing open adoption.
It appears as though courts are exercising less caution when ter-
minating parental rights of the mentally impaired than they had in
the past. Indeed, as the decision in In re E.M. revealed, courts will
terminate parental rights even though these parents were not at
fault and had done everything possible to try to regain full custody
of their children. Although Pennsylvania courts have held that
parents do not have to be at fault in order to have their rights
terminated, 29 this author contends that the courts should consider
the fact that some parents did not deliberately fail to meet the
122. In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 482. At the time of the decision, one of Appellant's chil-
dren was a preteen and one was a teenager. Id.
123. See In re Dana Marie E., 492 N.Y.S.2d at 342. See also note 121.
124. In re E.M., 584 A.2d at 1024 (Johnson, J. dissenting).
125. Id. at 1027.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1023.
128. See In the Matter of Gregory B., 542 N.E.2d 1052, 1059 (NY 1989). The Court of
Appeals of New York held that incarcerated fathers failed to provide for the future of the
children, thereby leaving them in foster care for the majority of their childhood and thus
supporting the termination of their parental rights. In re Gregory B., 542 N.E.2d at 1052,
1058. The court refused to allow open adoption and held that it was for the legislature to
institute open adoptions. Id. at 1059.
129. In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 484 (citing In re William, 383 A.2d at 1239.)
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needs of their children; hence, they should not be punished be-
cause of their mental impairments.
The state should not be able to dissolve a natural parent-child
relationship because another family might be more advantageous
to the child."'0 A mother's rights should not be terminated when
she has tried her best to provide for her children, given the mental
capacity with which she was born.1 31 Although the courts have held
that it is the rights of the child and not the parent with which they
were concerned,13 the rights of the natural parent should not be
completely disregarded, especially where the needs and welfare of
the children would not best be met by termination of the parent-
child relationship.
Kelley A. Morrone
130. In re William, 383 A.2d at 1249. A court could not declare a child neglected sim-
ply because changing parents would improve the child's condition. Id. For example, a court
should not be able to terminate the rights of an uneducated parent on the ground that
educated parents would provide a better environment. Id.
131. Id.
132. In re C.R., 66 D.& C.2d at 161.
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